Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPRs), often referred to as Police Car Scanner License Plates, are sophisticated surveillance tools increasingly utilized by law enforcement agencies. These systems, mounted on police vehicles or fixed infrastructure, automatically capture and record license plate numbers of passing vehicles. But what exactly are they, and what are the implications for your privacy?
Alt text: Police car mounted license plate reader scanning vehicle license plates on a roadside.
At their core, police car scanner license plates, or ALPRs, utilize specialized digital cameras and computer software to rapidly photograph license plates. This technology instantly converts the images into readable text and compares them against extensive databases of “plates of interest.” These hotlists can include vehicles linked to terrorism watchlists, stolen vehicles, or outstanding parking violations. When a scanned license plate matches a hotlist entry, the system immediately alerts law enforcement.
Alt text: Stationary automatic license plate reader mounted on a pole overlooking a street to scan license plates.
The Privacy Paradox of Police Car Scanner License Plates
The fundamental issue with police car scanner license plates lies in their indiscriminate data collection. ALPR systems record every license plate they scan, regardless of whether a vehicle is suspected of any wrongdoing. As highlighted by the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, the sheer volume of data collection is only limited by the number of vehicles passing within camera range. This mass surveillance sweeps up vast amounts of information on innocent individuals.
Consider the Rhinebeck Police Department’s report of scanning 164,043 license plates over three months, with only eight matches to plates of interest. This staggering 99.99 percent “failure rate” underscores the immense amount of data collected on law-abiding citizens. The privacy implications of amassing location data on innocent people are profound.
The International Association of Chiefs of Police has cautioned about the potential for abuse, noting that “mobile LPR units could read and collect the license plate numbers of vehicles parked at addiction counseling meetings, doctors’ offices, health clinics, or even staging areas for political protests.” This capability can create a “chilling effect on social and political activities,” discouraging individuals from exercising their rights to assembly and association due to fear of government monitoring.
Furthermore, without robust privacy safeguards, local authorities using police car scanner license plates can build extensive databases tracking the movements of ordinary citizens over years. This data can be shared across different agencies, creating a comprehensive government record of individuals’ habits, associations, and even potentially revealing sensitive information about their personal lives, political affiliations, or religious beliefs.
An example from the City of Beacon Police Department illustrates this point vividly. Analyzing just one week of ALPR data for a single vehicle revealed 24 separate location captures. Using readily available tools like Google Maps, it becomes simple to map out a detailed picture of the vehicle owner’s movements, including overnight parking locations on Main Street. Even this limited dataset reveals potentially sensitive patterns, despite the driver not triggering any alerts or suspicion.
Alt text: Map showing vehicle locations tracked by police car scanner license plate readers in Beacon, NY, highlighting potential privacy implications.
Extended data collection from numerous police car scanner license plates, combined with advanced data analysis, can paint an alarmingly detailed and intrusive portrait of any individual’s life, regardless of any criminal activity.
The Pervasiveness of Automatic License Plate Readers
As of 2013, New York State’s Division of Criminal Justice Services had funded over 422 police car scanner license plate systems across the state, ensuring that every county had access to this technology. This figure excludes ALPRs owned by the New York State Police, the Department of Motor Vehicles, and the New York Police Department, suggesting an even wider deployment.
Density of Automatic License Plate Readers per 100,000 Residents in New York State
Darker areas indicate higher density of police car scanner license plates per resident.
Alt text: Heatmap showing density of police car scanner license plate readers per capita across New York State counties.
Even small municipalities in New York, like Oxford Village, Rhinebeck Village, and Gowanda Village, have adopted this technology, demonstrating its widespread adoption even in low-population areas. By 2014, the NYPD alone operated nearly 500 police car scanner license plates as part of its Domain Awareness System, a vast network of surveillance cameras and sensors. The NYPD has not confirmed whether it operates additional ALPR units outside this system.
Data Access and Sharing: Expanding the Surveillance Net
The reach of police car scanner license plate data extends beyond individual jurisdictions. Law enforcement agencies frequently share ALPR data through regional intelligence centers. For example, the Westchester Intelligence Center facilitates data sharing among various federal, state, and local agencies operating in Westchester County. Similar initiatives, like the Albany Crime Analysis Center, exist in other regions.
Furthermore, some local governments are partnering with private companies like Vigilant Solutions (now Flock Safety), which maintain massive nationwide databases of license plate data collected from both private and law enforcement ALPRs. Vigilant Solutions boasts a database containing billions of records and growing rapidly. This allows law enforcement to access an unprecedented amount of historical and real-time location data, even from areas where they don’t operate their own police car scanner license plates.
In a concerning development, the NYPD entered into a contract with Vigilant Solutions, granting them access to this vast private database. This expands the NYPD’s surveillance capabilities far beyond their own ALPR network, enabling them to monitor vehicle movements across the country, including in private residential areas, commercial zones, and business parks. The Vigilant database also offers functionalities to track vehicles historically or in real-time, conduct virtual stakeouts, and identify vehicles frequently seen together, significantly amplifying the privacy risks associated with police car scanner license plates.
The Urgent Need for Policy and Oversight
Despite the extensive use of police car scanner license plates and the sensitive data they collect, consistent policies and regulations are lacking. The responses to public records requests reveal a patchwork of local practices, with many jurisdictions failing to implement adequate safeguards for data collection, use, sharing, and retention.
Westchester County, with a high concentration of ALPRs, exemplifies this issue. The Westchester County Department of Public Safety, despite operating multiple ALPR units, lacked a written policy governing their use, data storage, access, or sharing. They initially planned to retain location data for a year, even though the vast majority of scans yielded no actionable intelligence. Similarly, Yonkers, another municipality in Westchester County, had no written policy and admitted to indefinitely storing all ALPR data collected.
The absence of robust privacy protections erodes public trust and creates a chilling effect on fundamental freedoms. It is crucial for local governments to prioritize public privacy concerns and adopt comprehensive policies before deploying and utilizing police car scanner license plate technology.
For a broader understanding of ALPR usage across the United States, refer to the ACLU report: You are Being Tracked: How License Plate Readers Are Being Used to Record Americans’ Movements.
DOCUMENTS
New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services
2012-07-30 FOIL Request
2013-08-27 FOIL Response
New York City Police Department
2014-01-07 FOIL Request
FOIL Response
New York City Comptroller
2015-04-09 Vigilant Solutions Contract
Localities Outside of New York City
FOIL Request to Non-New York City Localities, including:
- Albany County Sheriff’s Department (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)
- Ardsley Village
- Beacon City
- Bedford Town
- Blooming Grove
- Bronxville
- Chatham Village
- Chestertown
- Colonie Police Department (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4)
- Columbia County Sheriff
- Croton-on-Hudson Village
- Deerpark Town
- Dutchess County Office of Probation and Community Corrections
- Dutchess County Sheriff’s Office
- Fishkill Town
- Greenburgh Town
- Hudson (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
- Irvington Village
- Mamaroneck Town
- Mamaroneck Village
- Middletown City
- Monroe
- Mount Hope Town
- Mount Pleasant Town
- New Castle Town
- New Paltz Town
- New Rochelle City
- New Windsor Town
- Newburgh City
- Newburgh Town
- Orange County Probation Department
- Orangetown
- Ossining Village
- Peekskill City
- Pelham Village
- Port Jervis City
- Poughkeepsie City
- Poughkeepsie Town
- Rensselaer County Sheriff (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
- Rhinebeck Village
- Rockland County Sheriff
- Saratoga County Sheriff
- Saratoga Springs (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
- Saugerties
- Scarsdale Village
- Schenectady Police Department (Parts 1, 2)
- Shawangunk Town
- Sleepy Hollow
- Spring Valley Village
- Stony Point Town
- Sullivan County
- Ulster Town
- Warren County
- Warwick Town
- Washington County Sheriff (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)
- Westchester County Department of Public Safety
- Yonkers City
- Yorktown Town
Footnotes
1 New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, License Plate Reader Suggested Guidelines, Jan. 2011 at p. 6, available at http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/ofpa/pdfdocs/finallprguidelines01272011a.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at p.7.
5 Id. at p.6.
6 Rhinebeck Police Department FOIL Response: Quarterly License Plate Reader Progress Report Apr.-Jun 2011.
7 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Privacy Impact Assessment Report for Utilization of License Plate Readers (Sept. 2009) at p. 2, available at http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/LPR_Privacy_Impact_Assessment.pdf.
8 Id. at p.13.
9 New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) FOIL Response (Aug. 27, 2013).
10 Population numbers and area are from the 2010 Census of Population and Housing, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-2-34.pdf
11 Testimony of Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence and Counterterrorism John J. Miller, NYPD, Nov. 12, 2014.
12 See, e.g., Ardsley Village FOIL Response; Bedford Town FOIL Response;
13 See, e.g., Colonie PD FOIL Response.
14 Vigilant Solutions Scope of Work.
15 DCJS FOIL Response.
16 Westchester County Department of Public Safety FOIL Response.
17 Id..
18 City of Yonkers FOIL Response.
19 Id.
