Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPRs) have become an increasingly common tool for law enforcement agencies across the United States. In New York, these devices, often mounted on police cars or fixed in strategic locations, are used to scan and record the license plates of passing vehicles. While law enforcement agencies tout ALPRs as a valuable tool for public safety, civil liberties advocates raise serious concerns about privacy and the potential for mass surveillance. This article delves into the use of license plate scanners on police cars in New York, exploring how they work, the data they collect, and the ongoing debate surrounding their implementation.
Understanding Automatic License Plate Readers
So, what exactly are automatic license plate readers? Imagine a sophisticated camera system designed to capture and process license plates at an incredibly rapid pace. That’s essentially what an ALPR is. These devices use specialized digital cameras and computer software to photograph license plates and instantly convert the images into readable text. Crucially, ALPR systems record not just the license plate number, but also the date, time, and location of each scan.
License plate reader mounted on a police vehicle. Source: Town of Fishkill Police Department FOIL Response.
The scanned license plate numbers are then cross-referenced against “hot lists” – databases containing license plates of interest to law enforcement. These lists can include vehicles linked to stolen cars, wanted individuals, or even outstanding parking violations. If a scanned plate matches a plate on the hot list, the system alerts law enforcement personnel. This immediate alert system is what makes ALPRs attractive to police departments for real-time crime fighting and vehicle recovery.
Example of license plate reader technology. Source: Hudson Police Department FOIL Response.
The Privacy Problem: Mass Data Collection on New Yorkers
The core issue with license plate scanners isn’t their ability to identify vehicles on a hot list; it’s the indiscriminate collection of data on every single vehicle they scan. Regardless of whether a license plate is flagged or not, ALPRs record and store the data. As the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services acknowledges, the sheer volume of data collection is only limited by the number of cars passing the cameras. This means vast amounts of location data are being amassed on law-abiding citizens.
Consider the example of the Rhinebeck Police Department, which scanned over 164,000 license plates in just three months in 2011. Of those, a mere eight were plates of actual interest – a success rate of less than 0.01%. This means 99.99% of the data collected was on innocent individuals going about their daily lives. The potential for privacy invasion is immense.
The International Association of Chiefs of Police itself has recognized the inherent privacy risks, cautioning that ALPRs could capture data from vehicles parked at sensitive locations like addiction counseling centers, medical clinics, or even political protest staging areas. This kind of pervasive tracking can have a chilling effect on fundamental freedoms of association and expression.
Furthermore, the data collected by ALPRs can be stored indefinitely, creating a detailed record of an individual’s movements over time. Imagine a scenario where law enforcement agencies build massive databases tracking the daily habits, routines, and associations of countless New Yorkers. A simple example from the City of Beacon Police Department illustrates this point. Analysis of just one week of ALPR data for a single vehicle revealed 24 separate location readings, pinpointing the car’s presence on Main Street at various times, even indicating overnight parking patterns. While this single snapshot may seem innocuous, aggregated over time, across numerous vehicles and ALPR locations, it paints an incredibly detailed and potentially intrusive picture of individuals’ lives.
With access to more data, expanded ALPR networks, and advanced analytical tools, the potential to construct intimate profiles of innocent New Yorkers becomes a significant privacy concern.
ALPR Ownership and Expansion Across New York State
License plate reader technology is not limited to major cities. As of 2013, the Division of Criminal Justice Services had funded over 400 ALPR systems throughout New York State, ensuring that every county had access to this technology. Even small municipalities, like Oxford Village, Rhinebeck Village, and Gowanda Village, have deployed ALPRs.
The New York Police Department (NYPD) is a major operator of license plate scanners, with nearly 500 ALPRs integrated into its Domain Awareness System as of 2014. This centralized network combines security cameras, license plate readers, and other surveillance technologies. The full extent of the NYPD’s ALPR deployment, including any units outside the Domain Awareness System, remains unclear.
Density of Automatic License Plate Readers in NY State
Map showing the density of automatic license plate readers per 100,000 residents in New York State. Darker areas indicate higher density. Source: New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) FOIL Production (Aug. 27, 2013). Note: This map excludes ALPRs owned by NYPD, State Police, and NYS DMV.
This widespread adoption highlights the increasing reach of ALPR technology across diverse communities in New York.
Data Sharing and Access: Expanding the Surveillance Network
The concern over ALPR data is further amplified by the sharing of information between law enforcement agencies and even with private companies. In Westchester County, for instance, multiple federal, state, and local agencies collaborate through the Westchester Intelligence Center, pooling resources and data, including ALPR information. Similarly, the Albany area has established the Albany Crime Analysis Center for regional data sharing.
Adding another layer of complexity, some local governments are partnering with private companies like Vigilant Solutions (now known as Flock Safety). Vigilant Solutions maintains a massive nationwide database of license plate data, compiled from both private and law enforcement ALPR sources. This database reportedly contains billions of records and grows by millions more data points each month. By contracting with companies like Vigilant Solutions, law enforcement agencies gain access to a far broader surveillance network than their own ALPR systems provide.
In a significant move, New York City approved a contract allowing the NYPD to access the Vigilant Solutions database. This gives the NYPD the capability to track vehicle movements across the country, including locations potentially outside the reach of NYPD-owned ALPRs, such as apartment complexes, shopping centers, and business parks. The Vigilant database also offers advanced tracking features, including historical location monitoring, real-time tracking, and the ability to identify frequently co-located vehicles. These capabilities significantly expand the surveillance potential of ALPR technology and raise even greater privacy red flags.
Lack of Regulation and Policy: The Need for Privacy Safeguards
Despite the extensive use of license plate scanners, New York State lacks comprehensive statewide regulations governing their use. This absence of uniform policy leads to a patchwork of local practices, with varying levels of privacy protection. Alarmingly, many localities in New York have not implemented adequate policies to safeguard the collection, use, retention, and sharing of ALPR data.
Westchester County, with a significant number of ALPRs, serves as a stark example. The Westchester County Department of Public Safety, despite operating multiple ALPR units, admitted to having no written policy regarding their use or data handling procedures. They initially planned to retain location data for a year, even though the vast majority of scans yielded no actionable intelligence. Yonkers, another city in Westchester County with numerous ALPRs, also lacked a written policy and admitted to indefinite data retention.
These examples underscore a critical need for robust privacy protections and clear policies governing the use of license plate scanners. Without such safeguards, the potential for abuse and the erosion of privacy rights are substantial. Establishing clear guidelines for data retention, access, and usage is essential to balance legitimate law enforcement needs with the fundamental privacy rights of New Yorkers.
For further information on the broader use of automatic license plate readers across the US, refer to the ACLU report: You Are Being Tracked: How License Plate Readers Are Being Used to Record Americans’ Movements.
DOCUMENTS:
- New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services 2012-07-30 FOIL Request
- New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services 2013-08-27 FOIL Response
- New York City Police Department 2014-01-07 FOIL Request
- New York City Comptroller 2015-04-09 Vigilant Solutions Contract
- Localities Outside of New York City FOIL Request to Non-New York City Localities, including:
Footnotes
1. New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, License Plate Reader Suggested Guidelines, Jan. 2011 at p. 6, available at http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/ofpa/pdfdocs/finallprguidelines01272011a.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at p.7.
5. Id. at p.6.
6. Rhinebeck Police Department FOIL Response: Quarterly License Plate Reader Progress Report Apr.-Jun 2011.
7. International Association of Chiefs of Police, Privacy Impact Assessment Report for Utilization of License Plate Readers (Sept. 2009) at p. 2, available at http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/LPR_Privacy_Impact_Assessment.pdf.
8. Id. at p.13.
9. New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) FOIL Response (Aug. 27, 2013).
10. Population numbers and area are from the 2010 Census of Population and Housing, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-2-34.pdf
11. Testimony of Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence and Counterterrorism John J. Miller, NYPD, Nov. 12, 2014.
12. See, e.g., Ardsley Village FOIL Response; Bedford Town FOIL Response;
13. See, e.g., Colonie PD FOIL Response.
14. Vigilant Solutions Scope of Work.
15. DCJS FOIL Response.
16. Westchester County Department of Public Safety FOIL Response.
17. Id..
18. City of Yonkers FOIL Response.
19. Id.
