Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPRs), often referred to in the context of a “Car With License Plate Scanner” when mounted on vehicles, have become increasingly prevalent. Between 2012 and 2014, the NYCLU (New York Civil Liberties Union) initiated Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) requests to various New York State agencies, including the Division of Criminal Justice Services and the NYPD, alongside over 70 local government bodies. This was part of a broader nationwide effort, coordinated by the ACLU, to gain deeper insights into the expanding use of these surveillance technologies.
What are Automatic License Plate Readers?
Automatic license plate readers are sophisticated surveillance devices designed to capture and record license plate information from vehicles. These systems can be deployed in various configurations, most notably as a “car with license plate scanner” – mobile units mounted on police vehicles – or as fixed installations on poles or roadsides. At a minimum, these readers document the license plate number, date, time, and geographical location of every vehicle they scan.
Image depicting a police car equipped with a license plate scanner actively scanning license plates of vehicles on a road.
Modern license plate readers utilize advanced digital cameras and computer systems to rapidly process a high volume of license plate images. They convert these images into text and cross-reference them against extensive databases of “plates of interest,” often referred to as “hot lists.” These hot lists may include data from various sources, such as terrorist watch lists, lists of stolen vehicles, or records of parking violations. When a scanned license plate matches an entry on a hot list, the system generates an alert.
Image showcasing a stationary license plate reader affixed to a pole, illustrating its role in constant surveillance of vehicle traffic.
The Privacy Concerns Surrounding License Plate Scanners
The primary concern with automatic license plate readers, especially when considering a “car with license plate scanner” constantly patrolling streets, stems from their indiscriminate data collection. These systems record every license plate they scan, irrespective of whether a vehicle is linked to any wrongdoing or appears on a “hot list.” As highlighted by the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, the efficiency of this technology is such that the sheer number of license plates read is only limited by the volume of traffic passing the cameras. This mass collection of data raises significant privacy issues for law-abiding citizens.
Consider the example of the Rhinebeck Police Department, which reported scanning 164,043 license plates between April and June 2011. Of this massive number, only eight license plates were flagged as being of interest – a staggering 99.99 percent “failure rate” in terms of identifying actual targets. This illustrates the vast amount of data collected on innocent individuals.
The implications for privacy are profound. The International Association of Chiefs of Police has cautioned about the potential for “mobile LPR units,” like a “car with license plate scanner,” to collect data in sensitive locations such as addiction counseling centers, medical clinics, or even areas staging political demonstrations. This capability can have a “chilling effect on social and political activities,” as individuals may feel their movements are constantly monitored and recorded.
Furthermore, without robust privacy safeguards, local governments utilizing license plate readers can accumulate extensive databases detailing the movements of ordinary citizens over prolonged periods. This information can be stored indefinitely and even shared with external entities. Such systems can essentially create a comprehensive government database tracking the habits, associations, and potentially even the political and religious affiliations of individuals.
To illustrate this point, the NYCLU’s FOIL request to the City of Beacon Police Department yielded records of license plate scans. Analyzing just one week’s worth of data for a single vehicle, it was found that the license plate reader captured the car’s location 24 times. Using readily available tools like Google Maps, it was possible to pinpoint the car’s presence on Beacon’s Main Street at various times, revealing patterns in the driver’s movements, including overnight parking. Even this limited data set provides a surprisingly detailed snapshot of an individual’s routine, despite no indication of any wrongdoing.
Extrapolating this to larger datasets, encompassing data from numerous “car with license plate scanner” units and fixed readers over extended periods, and combined with advanced analytical tools, the potential for constructing an intensely detailed and intrusive picture of any individual’s life becomes alarmingly clear.
A heat map visualizing the concentration of license plate readers across New York State, highlighting areas with higher densities of ALPR systems per capita.
Ownership and Distribution of License Plate Readers
As of August 2013, the Division of Criminal Justice Services had funded at least 422 license plate reading systems throughout New York State, ensuring that every county within the state had access to this technology. Beyond local agencies, the New York State Police and the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles also operate these devices.
The reach of license plate reader technology extends even to smaller municipalities within New York. Villages like Oxford, Rhinebeck, and Gowanda, with populations ranging from approximately 800 to 2,700, utilize these systems. In major urban centers like New York City, the NYPD operates nearly 500 license plate readers as part of its Domain Awareness System, a centralized surveillance network encompassing cameras, scanners, and detectors. It remains unclear whether the NYPD operates additional ALPR units outside this system.
Data Access and Sharing
Access to the data collected by automatic license plate readers often extends beyond the local agencies that directly operate them. In Westchester County, for instance, various federal, state, and local law enforcement bodies collaborate within the Westchester Intelligence Center, facilitating data sharing amongst participating agencies. Similar data-sharing initiatives, like the Albany Crime Analysis Center, exist in other regions.
Furthermore, some local governments are engaging with private companies that maintain vast databases of driving history. Responses to FOIL requests from towns like New Castle and Yonkers revealed collaborations with Vigilant Solutions (now known as Flock Safety), a private entity that offers access to a nationwide license plate data database compiled from both private and law enforcement ALPR sources. Vigilant Solutions’ database contains billions of records and grows by millions of data points monthly. The NYPD has also explored and implemented contracts to access the Vigilant Solutions database, significantly expanding their surveillance capabilities.
An updated contract between the NYPD and Vigilant Solutions reveals the extent of enhanced surveillance capabilities. Access to Vigilant’s database enables the NYPD to monitor vehicle locations across the country, including areas potentially beyond the reach of NYPD-owned “car with license plate scanner” units, such as apartment complexes, retail zones, and office parks. The database also offers functionalities to track vehicle movements historically or in real-time, conduct virtual stakeouts, and identify vehicles frequently seen in proximity to each other. These advanced features amplify the already significant privacy concerns associated with automatic license plate readers.
Lack of Uniform Policies and Regulations
The absence of statewide regulations governing the use of automatic license plate readers has resulted in a patchwork of inconsistent policies and procedures across different localities. FOIL request responses indicated that many jurisdictions in New York State lack adequate policies to protect the collection, use, retention, and sharing of location data obtained through ALPRs.
Westchester County, with a substantial number of ALPR units, exemplifies this issue. Despite operating five license plate readers, the Westchester County Department of Public Safety lacked a written policy regarding their use, data storage, access, or sharing. The department planned to retain location data for a year, even though the vast majority of scans yielded no actionable intelligence. Similarly, Yonkers, operating multiple mobile and stationary ALPRs, had no written usage policy and admitted to indefinitely storing all collected data.
The lack of robust privacy protections associated with “car with license plate scanner” and fixed ALPR systems can erode public trust in law enforcement and create a chilling effect on fundamental freedoms. It is crucial for local governments to prioritize and implement comprehensive policies that address public privacy concerns before deploying and utilizing automatic license plate reader technology.
For a broader perspective on the use of automatic license plate readers nationwide, refer to the ACLU report: You Are Being Tracked: How License Plate Readers Are Being Used to Record Americans’ Movements.
DOCUMENTS
New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services
2012-07-30 FOIL Request
2013-08-27 FOIL Response
New York City Police Department
2014-01-07 FOIL Request
FOIL Response
New York City Comptroller
2015-04-09 Vigilant Solutions Contract
Localities Outside of New York City
FOIL Request to Non-New York City Localities, including:
- Albany County Sheriff’s Department (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)
- Ardsley Village
- Beacon City
- Bedford Town
- Blooming Grove
- Bronxville
- Chatham Village
- Chestertown
- Colonie Police Department (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4)
- Columbia County Sheriff
- Croton-on-Hudson Village
- Deerpark Town
- Dutchess County Office of Probation and Community Corrections
- Dutchess County Sheriff’s Office
- Fishkill Town
- Greenburgh Town
- Hudson (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
- Irvington Village
- Mamaroneck Town
- Mamaroneck Village
- Middletown City
- Monroe
- Mount Hope Town
- Mount Pleasant Town
- New Castle Town
- New Paltz Town
- New Rochelle City
- New Windsor Town
- Newburgh City
- Newburgh Town
- Orange County Probation Department
- Orangetown
- Ossining Village
- Peekskill City
- Pelham Village
- Port Jervis City
- Poughkeepsie City
- Poughkeepsie Town
- Rensselaer County Sheriff (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
- Rhinebeck Village
- Rockland County Sheriff
- Saratoga County Sheriff
- Saratoga Springs (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
- Saugerties
- Scarsdale Village
- Schenectady Police Department (Parts 1, 2)
- Shawangunk Town
- Sleepy Hollow
- Spring Valley Village
- Stony Point Town
- Sullivan County
- Ulster Town
- Warren County
- Warwick Town
- Washington County Sheriff (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)
- Westchester County Department of Public Safety
- Yonkers City
- Yorktown Town
Footnotes
1 New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, License Plate Reader Suggested Guidelines, Jan. 2011 at p. 6, available at http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/ofpa/pdfdocs/finallprguidelines01272011a.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at p.7.
5 Id. at p.6.
6 Rhinebeck Police Department FOIL Response: Quarterly License Plate Reader Progress Report Apr.-Jun 2011.
7 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Privacy Impact Assessment Report for Utilization of License Plate Readers (Sept. 2009) at p. 2, available at http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/LPR_Privacy_Impact_Assessment.pdf.
8 Id. at p.13.
9 New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) FOIL Response (Aug. 27, 2013).
10 Population numbers and area are from the 2010 Census of Population and Housing, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-2-34.pdf
11 Testimony of Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence and Counterterrorism John J. Miller, NYPD, Nov. 12, 2014.
12 See, e.g., Ardsley Village FOIL Response; Bedford Town FOIL Response;
13 See, e.g., Colonie PD FOIL Response.
14 Vigilant Solutions Scope of Work.
15 DCJS FOIL Response.
16 Westchester County Department of Public Safety FOIL Response.
17 Id..
18 City of Yonkers FOIL Response.
19 Id.
