License plate scanners, also known as Automatic License Plate Readers (ALPRs), are becoming increasingly common tools in law enforcement. Mounted on police cars or fixed in strategic locations, these devices automatically capture images of license plates from passing vehicles. But what exactly are these scanners, and what are the implications for privacy?
Source: Town of Fishkill Police Department FOIL Response.
Modern license plate scanners utilize advanced digital cameras and computer systems to rapidly photograph and convert license plates into readable text. This data is then cross-referenced against “hot lists,” databases containing license plates of interest, which could include vehicles linked to stolen cars, wanted individuals, or even unpaid parking tickets. When a scanned plate matches a plate on the hot list, the system alerts law enforcement.
Source: Hudson Police Department FOIL Response.
The Privacy Concerns Surrounding License Plate Scanners
The major concern with license plate scanners isn’t necessarily catching vehicles on a hot list. The issue lies in the fact that these systems record every license plate they scan, regardless of whether the vehicle is of interest or not. As highlighted by the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, the technology’s capability is only limited by the number of vehicles passing the cameras. This mass collection of data raises significant privacy implications for ordinary citizens.
Consider the example of the Rhinebeck Police Department, which scanned 164,043 license plates over three months in 2011. Out of this massive number, only eight plates were flagged as being of interest. This means a staggering 99.99% of the scanned plates belonged to innocent individuals. The International Association of Chiefs of Police has acknowledged the potential for abuse, warning that license plate scanners could record vehicles parked at sensitive locations like addiction recovery meetings, medical clinics, or even political protest staging areas. This kind of pervasive surveillance can have a chilling effect on fundamental rights, impacting social and political activities.
Without robust privacy safeguards, the data collected by license plate scanners can create extensive databases detailing the movements of ordinary people over long periods. This information can be stored indefinitely and even shared across different agencies. Imagine a scenario where law enforcement builds a massive database tracking the daily routines, habits, and associations of countless individuals, regardless of any suspicion of wrongdoing.
An example from the City of Beacon Police Department illustrates this point starkly. Analyzing just one week of license plate scans for a single vehicle, it was revealed that the car’s location was recorded 24 times. Using readily available tools like Google Maps, it was possible to map the car’s movements on Beacon’s Main Street, revealing patterns and habits. Even this limited data provides a surprisingly detailed picture of the vehicle owner’s activities, including overnight parking locations. While the driver in this instance was not flagged for any violations, the potential for collecting sensitive and personal information is undeniable.
With wider deployment of license plate scanners, longer data retention periods, and advanced analytical tools, an incredibly detailed and intrusive picture of an individual’s life can be assembled, even if they are completely innocent.
The Proliferation of License Plate Scanners
License plate scanner technology is widely adopted. As of 2013, the Division of Criminal Justice Services had funded over 422 license plate reading systems across New York State, ensuring that every county had at least one. This figure excludes systems owned by the New York State Police, the Department of Motor Vehicles, and the New York Police Department (NYPD), meaning the actual number is even higher.
Automatic License Plate Readers, Density Per 100,000 Residents.*
Darker areas indicate more automatic license plate readers per resident.
Source: New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) FOIL Production (Aug. 27, 2013). *This map is limited to Plate Readers that are funded through DCJS. Municipalities may have more units through other funding streams. This map also excludes any Plate Reader owned by the NYPD, the State Police, and the NYS DMV.
Even small towns and villages are equipped with this technology. In New York, this includes places like Oxford Village, Rhinebeck Village, and Gowanda Village, demonstrating the widespread reach of license plate scanners even in low-population areas. The NYPD alone operates nearly 500 license plate scanners as part of its Domain Awareness System, a vast network of surveillance technologies. It remains unclear if the NYPD operates additional scanners outside this system, further highlighting the opacity surrounding the technology’s use.
Data Access and Sharing: Who’s Watching You?
The reach of license plate scanner data extends beyond local jurisdictions. Data sharing agreements are common, allowing various law enforcement agencies to access information collected by different systems. In Westchester County, for example, numerous federal, state, and local agencies participate in the Westchester Intelligence Center, facilitating data sharing. Similarly, the Albany area has established the Albany Crime Analysis Center for regional data sharing.
Furthermore, some local governments are partnering with private companies that maintain massive databases of driving history. Vigilant Solutions, for instance, is a company that aggregates license plate data from both private and law enforcement sources and sells access to this vast database. Their database reportedly contains billions of records and grows by millions more data points each month. The NYPD has even considered contracting with Vigilant Solutions to access their extensive database, raising further concerns about the expansion of surveillance capabilities.
Update (January 2016): The contract between the NYPD and Vigilant Solutions was finalized, revealing the expanded surveillance powers it grants. Access to Vigilant’s database allows the NYPD to track individuals’ locations nationwide, including areas beyond the reach of their own scanners, such as apartment complexes, retail centers, and office buildings. The database enables historical and real-time tracking, virtual stakeouts, and the identification of frequently co-located vehicles. These features amplify the already significant privacy concerns associated with license plate scanners.
Lack of Regulation and Policy
The absence of consistent statewide or federal regulations governing the use of license plate scanners is a major issue. Policies and procedures vary widely across localities, and many jurisdictions lack adequate safeguards for data collection, use, sharing, and retention.
Westchester County, with a significant number of license plate scanners, serves as an example. Despite operating five scanners, the Westchester County Department of Public Safety had no written policy regarding their use, data storage, access, or sharing as of 2012. Their data retention plan was to keep location data for one year, despite an extremely low “hit” rate of 0.1% in a sample month. Yonkers, also in Westchester County, with multiple mobile and stationary scanners, similarly lacked a written policy and admitted to indefinitely storing all collected data.
This lack of robust privacy protections undermines public trust and creates a chilling effect on civil liberties. Local governments must prioritize the adoption of clear and comprehensive policies addressing privacy concerns before deploying and utilizing license plate scanner technology. Establishing strong regulations is crucial to balance legitimate law enforcement needs with the fundamental privacy rights of the public.
For a broader perspective on license plate scanner use across the United States, refer to the ACLU report: You are Being Tracked: How License Plate Readers Are Being Used to Record Americans’ Movements.
DOCUMENTS
New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services
2012-07-30 FOIL Request
2013-08-27 FOIL Response
New York City Police Department
2014-01-07 FOIL Request
FOIL Response
New York City Comptroller
2015-04-09 Vigilant Solutions Contract
Localities Outside of New York City
FOIL Request to Non-New York City Localities, including:
- Albany County Sheriff’s Department (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)
- Ardsley Village
- Beacon City
- Bedford Town
- Blooming Grove
- Bronxville
- Chatham Village
- Chestertown
- Colonie Police Department (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4)
- Columbia County Sheriff
- Croton-on-Hudson Village
- Deerpark Town
- Dutchess County Office of Probation and Community Corrections
- Dutchess County Sheriff’s Office
- Fishkill Town
- Greenburgh Town
- Hudson (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
- Irvington Village
- Mamaroneck Town
- Mamaroneck Village
- Middletown City
- Monroe
- Mount Hope Town
- Mount Pleasant Town
- New Castle Town
- New Paltz Town
- New Rochelle City
- New Windsor Town
- Newburgh City
- Newburgh Town
- Orange County Probation Department
- Orangetown
- Ossining Village
- Peekskill City
- Pelham Village
- Port Jervis City
- Poughkeepsie City
- Poughkeepsie Town
- Rensselaer County Sheriff (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8)
- Rhinebeck Village
- Rockland County Sheriff
- Saratoga County Sheriff
- Saratoga Springs (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7)
- Saugerties
- Scarsdale Village
- Schenectady Police Department (Parts 1, 2)
- Shawangunk Town
- Sleepy Hollow
- Spring Valley Village
- Stony Point Town
- Sullivan County
- Ulster Town
- Warren County
- Warwick Town
- Washington County Sheriff (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9)
- Westchester County Department of Public Safety
- Yonkers City
- Yorktown Town
Footnotes
1 New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, License Plate Reader Suggested Guidelines, Jan. 2011 at p. 6, available at http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/ofpa/pdfdocs/finallprguidelines01272011a.pdf.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at p.7.
5 Id. at p.6.
6 Rhinebeck Police Department FOIL Response: Quarterly License Plate Reader Progress Report Apr.-Jun 2011.
7 International Association of Chiefs of Police, Privacy Impact Assessment Report for Utilization of License Plate Readers (Sept. 2009) at p. 2, available at http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/LPR_Privacy_Impact_Assessment.pdf.
8 Id. at p.13.
9 New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) FOIL Response (Aug. 27, 2013).
10 Population numbers and area are from the 2010 Census of Population and Housing, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/cph-2-34.pdf
11 Testimony of Deputy Commissioner of Intelligence and Counterterrorism John J. Miller, NYPD, Nov. 12, 2014.
12 See, e.g., Ardsley Village FOIL Response; Bedford Town FOIL Response;
13 See, e.g., Colonie PD FOIL Response.
14 Vigilant Solutions Scope of Work.
15 DCJS FOIL Response.
16 Westchester County Department of Public Safety FOIL Response.
17 Id..
18 City of Yonkers FOIL Response.
19 Id.
